Table of Contents 64q43
Porto Alegre and New Orleans, in the USA, share a sad story: a gigantic flood that left their respective structures inoperable. Both regions with rich cultural heritage, these municipalities — and their respective metropolitan regions — were pushed to their limits by extreme weather events: Greater Porto Alegre with its flood, New Orleans with the hurricane Katrina. 3c6p40
Post-Katrina lessons can be of great value to the people of Rio Grande do Sul. In view of the applicants rain in Rio Grande do Sul, these would be lessons that would become even more crucial for the region’s resilience.
Alerts were underestimated 682j6u
Brazil, like the world, has been following a series of environmental disasters of increasing proportions in recent years. In 2021, it was mountainous region of Rio de Janeiro. In 2023, we had San Sebastian on the coast of São Paulo. The disaster that befell the Rio Grande do Sul in the last week is not only the latest, but also the biggest one.
The metropolitan region of Porto Alegre has been suffering from floods more and more frequently. Its flood protection system was created after the great flood of 1941. It is made up of 14 metal gates located in the wall of Mauá (city center) and under Avenida Castelo Branco, in addition to 23 pump houses that return water accumulated in nearby neighborhoods to Lake Guaíba, and more than 68 km of dikes internal and external.
It turns out that the waters exceeded safe levels three times in 80 years (1941, 1967 and 2015) and three times only in 2023. The two biggest historical floods in Guaíba, until then, occurred within an interval of just 55 days last spring. The region suffered ten extreme rain events in just 12 months, between June 23 and May 24. Several municipalities created along the bends of rivers in Rio Grande do Sul had already accumulated structural and financial losses in recent months. Forecast models developed in UFRGS Hydraulic Research Institute already pointed out the probability of what actually happened. Apparently the warnings were not taken seriously. And the protection system in the capital of Rio Grande do Sul failed — due to an apparent lack of maintenance. What occurred in May 2024 was a disaster announced.
Such floodgates, in any case, would not protect some of the most devastated municipalities in the region, such as Eldorado, Canoas, São Leopoldo, Muçum and practically the entire Taquari valley.
Exchanges of accusations between local and federal governments are already taking place. The city of Porto Alegre states that the funds promised by Brasília in November 2023 (after the then heavy rain) would not have been released until now. In turn, the city hall is accused of scrapping the DMAE, the body responsible for maintaining the flood prevention system. The government of Rio Grande do Sul sanctions a law that makes protection for APPs for the construction of dams more flexible and appears to ignore a prevention plan created in 2017. Congress, is processing what ecologists call the “destruction package” — more than 20 bills that in theory weaken current environmental legislation in what many claim is in favor of real estate and livestock speculation. At this point, shouldn’t we all consider ourselves “ecologists”?
New Orleans: an example w4m73
In the United States there is a federal agency for disaster control, the FEMA. This agency was heavily criticized for its slow response after the Katrina. Brazil does not have such a structure. We have the Civil defense, which acts more in responding to emergencies than in prevention itself. But FEMA's lessons learned during the 2005 crisis can direct part of the efforts of the Gaucho and Brazilian governments.
In the very week of the destruction of New Orleans, the US government released an emergency package worth US$10 billion for the region and the deployment of 7.200 soldiers. Non-governmental organizations — led by Red Cross — raised US$4.25 billion in donations. In the end, it is estimated that the reconstruction of the region and the relocation of people cost US$125 billion (R$650 billion). Such values (not updated) referring to the costs of Katrina are equivalent to 7% of Brazilian GDP.
In the United States, there was a lot of debate about whether federal money should be used to rebuild New Orleans or whether it should simply be abandoned. There were three main arguments that led to federal investment for its reconstruction:
- The city is considered a cultural heritage for the United States just as Venice is for Italy;
- Maintenance of the dike system that protected the city — and failed — was an obligation of US Army engineers;
- Oil exploration off the coast of Louisiana generated more than enough federal funds to improve the levee system in its main city.
At least 2 of the 3 arguments above would not apply to the capital of Rio Grande do Sul.
Entire neighborhoods needed to be rebuilt in New Orleans. From scratch. With planning and architects, in a project of large proportions, the main housing region to be rebuilt in the city is District 4. Among the many coincidences of the observed events, 4th District is what the most affected region in Porto Alegre is called, where the Grêmio Arena, the mall DC Navegantes and so many homes today appear partially or completely submerged.
It is important to that the current natural disaster in Greater Porto Alegre and the interior of Rio Grande do Sul appears to have even greater proportions than those observed in Louisiana. More than a dozen municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul practically no longer exist.
Approximately 1 million climate refugees were relocated from the Gulf of Mexico after Katrina, making it the largest diaspora in US history. More than half of the evacuated victims remained within a radius of up to 400 km from their original city, but just 4 weeks after the disaster, the country's 50 states were already ing the arrival of evacuees in 18.700 different zip codes. 240.000 families (out of a total of 1.5 million people affected) moved from the affected region to Houston (Texas), more than 500 km west of where they previously lived. In the 2020 census, 15 years after the hurricane, the population of New Orleans was 20% lower than in 2005.
The future of Rio Grande do Sul 4i2q1r
We still don't know for sure how many people — or entire cities — will need to be relocated in Rio Grande do Sul. But, most likely, not everyone will be able to return to the places where they lived by April 2024. In an interview with BBC Brazil, the ecologist and doctor Marcelo Dutra da Silva stated that entire cities will need to change location, leaving risk areas and moving to others that are more resistant to extreme climate variations — which are increasingly recurring.
In the US, FEMA, in conjunction with the federal government, has provided housing assistance (rent subsidy, hotel or property grant). motorhomes, as well as money for rebuilding homes) to more than 700.000 applicants — families and individuals. Only 1/5 of motorhomes promised were delivered, worsening the housing shortage in the city of New Orleans. In Brazil this can possibly be done in a “Bolsa Família"To Federal government with specific credit release actions by the Caixa. And popular pressure has been applied to reallocate part of the billion-dollar party fund for the recovery of the affected regions.
Post-Katrina, a meticulous technical report of almost 300 pages was prepared by US Army Corps of Engineers to prevent new similar cases and recover the affected region. Such a document could be useful to the Gaucho and Brazilian authorities in the steps to come.
The investments made in the state and the prevention work had an effect in Louisiana: in 2021, the region received another major storm, going — a Category 4 hurricane — and the new structures withstood the force of the elements. This is a point of hope for Porto Alegre and its future. But many months of work, planning and engagement of the population, the public and private sector will have to until the capital of Rio Grande do Sul can have more peace of mind. Adaptation policies need to be developed and followed. The future of much of the metropolitan region seems more uncertain. How to protect and relocate the most vulnerable will need to be not only an immediate concern, but also a medium and long term one.
In 2016 the Federal government created the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (PNA). Little known, it could be reformulated to consider increasingly extreme climate changes and facilitate emergency transfers to states and municipalities. Brazil has never been very used to getting ahead of problems. And public policies seem to normally be short-lived and electoral in nature. Our changes need to be profound. There is hope that from this suffering that today unites the population of Rio Grande do Sul and Brazil in a bond of solidarity, effective prevention policies will emerge that protect our population from growing and future climate events.
Text originally published on the author's LinkedIn.
See also: How to make donations to Rio Grande do Sul safely
reviewed by Glaucon Vital in 10 / 5 / 24.
